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Abstract— Service  composition  is  a  key  concept  of  Service-
Oriented Architecture that allows for combining loosely coupled
services  that  are  offered  and  operated  by  different  service
providers.  Such  environments  are  expected  to  dynamically
respond to changes that may occur at runtime, including changes
in  the  environment  and  individual  services  themselves.
Therefore, it is crucial to monitor these loosely-coupled services
throughout  their  lifetime.  In  this  paper,  we  present  a  novel
framework for monitoring services at runtime and ensuring that
services behave as they have promised. In particular, we focus on
monitoring non-functional properties that are specified within an
agreed security contract. The novelty of our work is based on the
way  in  which  monitoring  information  can  be  combined  from
multiple dynamic services to automate the monitoring of business
processes  and  proactively  report  compliance  violations.  The
framework  enables  monitoring  of  both  atomic  and  composite
services and provides a user friendly interface for specifying the
monitoring policy. We provide an information service case study
using a real composite service to demonstrate how we achieve
compliance  monitoring.  The  transformation  of  security  policy
into monitoring rules,  which is  done automatically,  makes our
framework more flexible and accurate than existing techniques.
Index Terms— Service-Oriented  Computing,  Composite
services,  Business  process  compliance,  Compliance  monitoring,
Security.
I. INTRODUCTION 
Service-Oriented  Architecture  (SOA)  allows  software
components from different providers to be exported as services
for external use. A service itself is a unit that offers a certain
functionality. If no single service can satisfy the functionality
required by the user, then SOA allows multiple services to be
combined  to  form  a  larger  application  to  fulfil  the  user
requirements.  A  SOA  platform  provides  a  foundation  for
modeling  and  composing  multiple  services  in  an  “ad-hoc”
manner.  Service  descriptions  are  published  by  service
developers and used by the potential users to discover services.
A service composer is a service provider that is responsible for
constructing  service  compositions  and  offering  them  to
consumers.  Service  discovery  is  based  on  matching  user
requirements  and  security  needs  with  the  published  service
descriptions. Typically, service composers will have different
needs and different requirements. They have varying business
goals and different expectations from a service; for example, in
terms of functionality,  quality of service and security needs.
Thus, it is important to make sure that a service should deliver
what  it  promises  and  should  match  the  user’s  expectations.
However,  SOA-based  applications  are  highly  dynamic  and
liable  to  change  heavily  at  runtime.  These  applications  are
made out of services that are deployed and run independently,
and  may  change  unpredictably  after  deployment.  Thus,
changes  may  occur  to  services  after  deployment  and  at
runtime, which may lead to a situation where services fail to
deliver  what  has  been  promised.  Traditional  verification
techniques  cannot  foresee  all  of  these  changes  as  they  are
mainly  pre-deployment  activities.  These  challenges  call  for
more  effective  approaches  towards  runtime  monitoring  of
services [1].[2].[3].[4].[5].[6]..
Service composition can be viewed in a process-oriented
perspective.  This  makes  the  composition  not  only  easy  to
understand but also the composition can be validated against
the desired rules and modified to suit the required operation. In
a process-oriented approach, service composition is described
by  means  of  workflow  languages  and  technologies.  The
workflow composition defines the operations to invoke and the
execution  order  of  the invocations  [7]..  A de-facto  standard
Business Process Model and Notation (BPMN) [8]. are widely
used as a modeling notation for business processes [9].. 
This  paper  focuses  on our monitoring framework  that  is
based on the runtime monitoring of a service to ensure that the
service  behaves  in  compliance  with  a  predefined  security
policy. We mainly concentrate on monitoring service behavior
throughout  the  service  execution  lifetime  to  ensure  that
services behave as promised. Alerts regarding policy violations
are sent as notifications. Current monitoring methods applied
to service execution environments focus on generating alerts
for a specific set of pre-built event-types. The dynamic nature
of SOAs also extends to the end-user security requirements. An
ideal  system might  allow different  users  to  be  awarded  the
opportunity  to  apply  their  own  security  policies  enforced
through a combination of design time and runtime checks. This
might be the case even where multiple users are accessing the
same services  simultaneously.  The main contribution of  our
framework is the focus on monitoring composite services and
checking  their  workflow,  invoked  sub-services,  compound
properties, etc. 
*  Parts of this research were done while the author was a Security
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It also allows different user-specified policies to be monitored
simultaneously at runtime with the accuracy of a monitoring
system  that  links  directly  into  the  service  execution
environment. Thus, the framework has the capability not only
to reveal the information predefined by the provider, but also to
be configured to allow users to specify the monitoring rules
(using the properties the service has to comply with). Finally,
taking  into  consideration  the  limitation  of  any  formal-based
enforcement approach, we provide a possibility to add custom
property checks for atomic services. These property checks can
be added to our framework  without any modification of the
formal  semantics  of  the  language  (ConSpec)  and  the
monitoring service itself. Due to this we can monitor a much
wider set of properties allowed by the formal language while
still enjoying its advantages.
The preliminary design of the monitoring framework and
the  event  model  have  been  described  in  a  previous  work
[10].[11]..  This  paper  amends  and  extends  the  monitoring
framework,  addresses  its  limitations,  and  evaluates  its
performance. In the previous work, the monitoring framework
was based on the use of Complex Event Processing (CEP). It
used  one  language  for  requirements  specification,  ConSpec
[12].,  and  another  one,  Drools  Fusion  [13].,  for  monitoring
these requirements. One major limitation of previous work was
a  missing  transformation  engine  required  to  translate
requirement  specifications  into  monitoring  rules.  The
monitoring rules  were defined manually through an external
interface. This introduced a lot of complexities, particularly for
dynamically  changing  service  compositions,  which indicated
the need for an automated operation. The work presented in
this paper uses one language for the requirement specification
and  the  actual  monitoring.  This  provides  a  seamless  and
uniform approach to service monitoring.  Our contribution in
this paper differs from the existing work, e.g. [10]., as follows:
• A  new  approach  has  been  proposed  where  only  one
language  (ConSpec)  has  been  used  for  both  the
requirements  specification  and  monitoring  rules.  The
Policy Decision Point (PDP) is developed as a part of the
monitoring  framework,  which  helps  in  translating
ConSpec  policies  into  monitoring  rules  and  decision-
making.
• The  ConSpec  policies  can  be  used  for  expressing
temporal  properties  spawning  across  several  atomic
services participating in a service composition. Moreover,
they can include meta-properties such as restricting the
service provider.
• The  monitoring  framework  is  developed  as  a  software
module and allows straightforward integration with other
modules or platforms. 
• We focus on monitoring non-functional  properties  (i.e.,
properties related to security and trust) that are specified
within  an  agreed  security  contract.  An  information
composite service case study (based on real services) has
been used to demonstrate the compliance monitoring with
a focus on two composite security properties.
• A ConSpec editor has been developed which provides a
graphical  user  interface  for  making  and  changing
ConSpec policies.
• The paper presents an in-depth performance evaluation to
show that our system is well-suited for highly dynamic
service compositions, which were missing in the previous
work.
The rest  of  the paper  is  organized as  follows: Section 2
describes  a  motivating  service  composition  example.  A
discussion of  the policy language is presented  in  Section 3.
Section  4  describes  the  event  model  we  propose  for  the
monitoring framework. Our proposed monitoring framework is
explained in Section 5. Sec. 6 describes the implementation of
the proposed monitoring framework.  Section 7 describes  the
assessment of the monitoring framework using a case study.
Section 8 presents an in-depth performance evaluation to show
that  our  system  is  well-suited  for  highly  dynamic  service
compositions. Section 9 compares our approach with existing
work  and  Section  10  concludes  the  paper  and  indicates  the
direction of our future work.
II. SECURE SERVICE COMPOSITION: AN EXAMPLE 
We  will  illustrate  our  approach  by  using  a  running
example. Fig. 1 presents an overview of the InfoService case
study.  In  this  example,  we  assume  a  small  company  that
designs,  develops,  and  provides  customized  services  to
customers.  We also assume that  customers  want  to  have  an
application that provides a location-based information service,
e.g., based on the current GPS coordinates of a mobile device
or  after  entering  an address.  The application  should  display
information such as the current weather or a map highlighting
various Points of Interest (PoI).
As there are many services available that already provide
such information, it is a quite natural approach to building this
new application based on already existing services, e.g.:
1. A  GeoCoding  type  service,  which  takes  a  street
address  as  input  and  produces  the  associated
geographical coordinates;
2. A PointOfInterest type service that takes geographical
coordinates  (output  of  GeoCoding  service)  as  input
and  returns  the  places  that  the  end  user  can  be
interested in;
3. A WeatherForecast type service that takes as input the
geographical coordinates and returns the information
about the weather predictions at the closest location to
the end user;
4. A  Map  type  service  that  takes  potential  places  of
interests originated by (2) as input and returns a map
showing the position and distance of the end user to
each of these places;
5. A WebPageInfoCollector type service takes a set of
information related to a location gained from (3) and
(4) as input, and returns a Web page that shows it.
The resulting composite service is named InfoService. Each
service in the InfoService composition is bound to a real Web
Service  running  in  the  background  and  registered  with  a
Marketplace  (e.g.,  Aniketos  Marketplace  [14].).  After
providing the street address of the user as input, the composite
service returns a Web page with some information related to
the user’s location.
       Operating even such a simple service composition raises
already a number of security (e.g., data privacy, access control,
see  Brucker,  et  al.  [15]. for  a  more  detailed  discussion),
trustworthiness  (e.g.,  customers  may  trust  different  service
parties  of  a  service  composition  to  a  different  extend,  see
Elshaafi et al.  [16]. for a more detailed discussion), reliability
(i.e.,  services  should deliver  correct  results),  and availability
(e.g., services should always be available) concerns.
In our example, customers usually consider revealing their
current  locations  as  a  privacy  violation.  Thus,  the  GPS
coordinates  should  only  be  transferred  to  the  services  that
actually require such information for their operation. Moving
one step further, we see that the WeatherForecast requires an
approximation  of  the  location  (e.g.,  the  city),  while  the
PointOfInterest  service  and  Map  service  need  the  precise
location  for  producing  more  accurate  and  precise  results.
Secondly, the service provider might need a separation of duty
of the PointOfInterest service and WeatherForecast service to
prevent  fraud.  In other  words,  a  malicious provider  offering
both the PointOfInterest  and WeatherForecast  services  could
deliberately  predict  bad weather  conditions for  certain  areas
(i.e.,  to  harm it  financially);  hence,  convinces  users  to  visit
different places. Consequently, this threatens the repudiation of
the composed WebPageInfoCollector.
Fig. 1: Overview of InfoService Components.
These requirements need to be considered during the entire
lifecycle of the service composition (i.e., from the requirements
engineering,  to  the  development,  to  the  operation  of  the
application). Service composition based applications are highly
dynamic.  Thus,  specification  and  runtime  enforcement  of
security  properties  is  not  sufficient  [17]..  The  security,
trustworthiness, reliability, and availability of atomic services
as well as composed services need to be monitored constantly
and, depending on the observations, necessary actions need to
be taken. For example, if the monitoring shows evidence that
the trustworthiness of a service falls below a certain threshold,
a  dynamic  re-composition  should  replace  this  service  with
another  service  of  a  similar  kind  that  satisfies  the  required
trustworthiness level. 
III. POLICY LANGUAGE
We need a  suitable  policy  language to  specify  what  we
need  to  monitor.  In  general,  this  language  should  serve  for
other  purposes  as  well,  e.g.,  it  should  specify  the  security
requirements  for  a  service  (either  desired  by a consumer  or
advertised by a service provider). Naturally, we may use one
language  for  requirements  specification  and  another  one  for
monitoring these  requirements  (as  it  is  done in  Asim et  al.
[10].). In this case, there is a need for a transformation engine
between these languages. Thus, one language for both purposes
significantly reduces the complexity [18].. 
We were looking for a language which could:
• Express security properties and policies for hierarchical
services;
• Be expressive enough, clear and simple in processing at
the same time;
• Be generated by both humans and software;
• Be  able  to  express  complex  (security  and  privacy)
policies;
• Be  used  for  requirements  specification,  matching,
monitoring and reasoning.
We  considered  several  candidates,  that  are  exploited  by
current  state  of  the  art  frameworks  such  as  WS02
(https://www.ws02.com), for such kind of language. XACML
[19]. is  a general-purpose policy language,  but it  is  deemed
cruel  to  write  policies  with  it  and  to  reason  about  them.
Moreover, we will need to use the constraint part of policies in
a nonstandard way. Event Calculus [20]. is suitable for runtime
monitoring  and  representing  policies  in  a  dynamic
environment.  On the other  hand,  the syntax of the language
becomes  too  complex  for  compound  services.  Furthermore,
considerable  effort  is  required  to  automate  generation  and
runtime  monitoring  of  such  policies.  The  PROTUNE  [21].
language  has  high  expressivity  and  can  be  used  to  specify
complex  policies  in  a  distributed  environment.  The  main
disadvantages of the method relates to its strength. Because of
such enormous expressivity the language is complex for policy
writing and reasoning. 
Based  on  the  above  analysis,  we  select  the  ConSpec
language for  our purposes.  The ConSpec language has been
proposed  by  the  University  of  Trento  (UNITN)  and  Royal
Institute of Technology (KTH) in the scope of the Security of
Software  and  Services  for  Mobile  Systems  (S3MS)  project
[22].. Briefly, we can see the language as follows1:
The tag RULE ID defines the id of the policy. The tag SCOPE
specifies whether the rule is applied to one specific execution
or to all executions of the service.  The tag  SECURITY STATE
defines  the  global  variables  and  their  initial  values.  Then,
several events are checked BEFORE or AFTER occurrence. 
If an event occurred, we check guards one by one until we
find the one that is satisfactory. In this case, certain security
updates are performed. If no guards are fired for the event, then
the  further  execution  is  not  permitted  (and  some  further
security actions, like notifying the customer, are triggered). In
case no security updates are needed but the further execution is
allowed, there is a special  action “skip”, which does not do
anything but continues the execution. There is also a possibility
of specifying an ELSE statement for the cases, when the further
execution should be allowed even if no guards are fired2.
Fig. 2: The Concrete Syntax of ConSpec.
1 We refer the reader to Aktug and Naliuka [8] for more details, and Fig. 2
2 We omitted this option here for simplicity
The ConSpec language can be straightforwardly mapped to
the ConSpec automata. This automata can be seen as A = (Q,
T, δ, q0), where Q is a set of states and q0 ∈ Q is an initial state,
T is a set of actions, and δ is a (partial) transition function δ : Q
× T → Q. A state can be seen simply as a specific assignment
to the variables defined in the SECURITY STATE part. Naturally,
the assignment defined in the SECURITY STATE part defines q0.
Actions are defined by the guarded events (specified between
BEFORE, AFTER, and PERFORM), i.e., by the name of the event
(class  and  method),  the  set  of  its  parameters  and  possible
assignments for these parameters (in the  AFTER  case also the
results  of  the  event  are  considered).  Finally,  the  (partial)
transition functions join states with the parameters which fire
some of the specified guards and the states which are received
after the application of the corresponding updates.
There are a number of advantages of ConSpec. First, this
language  was  developed  for  security  purposes  and  allows
guarding possible actions performed by a system. It represents
behavior in terms of different events that allow policies to be
checked  at  runtime.  Policy  written  in  ConSpec  has  a
comparatively simple semantics, and is simple to learn.
ConSpec  is  an  automata-based  language.  Although  this
feature slightly reduces its expressiveness (in comparison with
its  predecessor  PSLan Erlingsson  [23].,  or  other  declarative
languages as EventCalculus  [20]., XACML [19]., PROTUNE
[21]., etc.),  however,  this feature allows automatic reasoning
on it. Thus, ConSpec permits defining complex policies, which
are necessary to specify security requirements, and provides an
efficient  way to check them. In other words,  next to simple
value checking policies (e.g., verifying that the trustworthiness
level of a service is higher than some threshold), ConSpec is
devised to monitor complex logical constructions (i.e., security
policies)  without  the  need  for  an additional  layer  of  logical
verification.  In  addition,  ConSpec  provides  the  embedded
facility to evaluate properties before/after the monitored events,
which  is  required  particularly  by  Application  security  to
prevent  potentially  malicious  events  from  happening.
Furthermore, the language is straightforward to define a policy
decision  point  for  monitoring  purposes  if  an  automaton  is
available.  Also,  ConSpec  defines  different  scopes  of  its
application.  Thus,  we  may  define  a  policy  for  a  single
execution of a service or multiple executions.
Being  based  on  basic  programming  and  logical  rules,
ConSpec is an easy to learn language. Nevertheless, for most
common applications, the details could be even hidden from
the policy maker: an expert may define a template for a policy
(i.e., a ConSpec Rule, where only initial Security State should
be instantiated) and users will be required to simply provide the
required input. This capability is very important for services,
where the same security policy could be applied to any service
for some hierarchical piece of business process: the only thing
to be done is to instantiate the same selected template for low
level services.
IV. EVENT MODEL
The monitoring framework we propose is built around the
concept of events. It is an event-driven approach that allows
the monitoring system to analyze events and react to certain
situations as they occur. Any viable monitoring system must
have the ability to analyze and identify the correct events in a
timely  manner.  Fig.  3  displays  a  simplified  version  of  our
proposed  event  model.  This  organizes  different  event  types
allowing us to reason about and provide a generic way to deal
with them. 
Event  Listeners  are  embedded  into  the  BPMN
specifications which are triggered by events during workflow
execution.   These listeners can be configured at the Process
level, Activity level or Transition level to generate events.
Fig. 3: Event Model.
Our event model is based on two types of process variables;
Base Variables and Domain Specific Variables. Both types of
variable  are  available  during  the  execution  of  a  business
process and could be used for monitoring. The listeners have
access  to  these  process  variables  and  can  create  events
populated using their associated values, sending for analysis.
The Base Variables inherit common attributes from the process
itself, e.g., the process ID, process name, activity ID, activity
name, process start time, etc. However,  the Domain Specific
Variables,  declared  in  the  SECURITY  STATE  section  of
ConSpec rules, are user defined and may build upon the Base
Variables.  For  example,  to  analyse  the  load  on  a  particular
service, we could accumulate all start processing events for that
service  over  the  last  hour.  An  alert  message  should  be
generated if the number of requests is more than a threshold
value in the last hour. This threshold value is a user-defined
attribute falling within the Domain Specific Variables.
In  the  following  discussion,  we  try  to  determine  the
structure of events that should be received for analysis. In our
proposed framework, an overall process represents a composite
service and an activity represents a service component. Fig. 4
shows an example of events for the InfoService BPMN process
executed in a specific order.
In this example, the InfoService BPMN process comprises
five  service  tasks  each  with  a  Start and  End event.  The
monitoring  of  an  activity  may  need  only  the  process  ID,
activity  start  and end events.  The selection of  start  and end
events for listening is determined by the nature of the monitor.
With such events we can aggregate the data received so far and
analyze it before (after) execution of a specific activity. Thus,
we can  prevent  invocation  of  a  service  if  it  potentially  can
violate  the  contract.  Then,  the  alarm  rule  is  fired  and
appropriate  reaction  may  be  carried  out,  e.g.,  change  the
service fulfilling the activity.
Fig. 4: Event Flow.
In our proposal, an event structure describes the data and
structure associated with an event. It  helps in organizing the
data that is required for monitoring. Below we define the event
structure for our proposed monitoring framework.
1. Process level event
processName
eventLevel (processLevelEvent)
eventName (Start or End)
eventTime (Timestamp)
Variable 0 . . . n – domain specific variables
2. Activity level event
processName
activityName (name of the Service or User Task)
eventLevel (activityLevelEvent)
eventType (Service Task or User Task)
eventName (Start or End)
processFlow (used to construct a composition
work-flow)
eventTime (Timestamp)
Variable 0 . . . n – domain specific variables
eventDate (e.g., 2013/04/05)
V. THE SECURITY POLICY MONITORING
FRAMEWORK
Our monitoring framework is a software module that runs
in parallel  to a BPMN process and observes its behavior by
intercepting the events that are produced by the processes. The
framework  we  describe  is  modular  and  allows  a  simple
integration with other modules or platforms. The components
of  the  monitoring framework  are  illustrated in  Fig.  5  and a
description of each of the monitoring units follows.
A. Monitoring Policy
A monitoring policy is a set of requirements, defined using
the language ConSpec, which specifies what to monitor for a
particular BPMN process. These requirements can be specified
by  a  service  provider  as  well  as  by  a  service  consumer
(depending on the contract specification process). 
B.  Monitoring Rule Repository
It  is  a  database  of  monitoring rules  used for  monitoring
services.  The  rules  defined  in  the  monitoring  policy  are
translated into monitoring rules by the monitoring module and
are stored in the Monitoring rule repository. An example of a
monitoring rule might specify that the trust value of a service
should  be  continuously  monitored  so  that  a  notification  is
generated as soon as the value falls below a given threshold.
C. Event Manager
This module gathers the events coming from the runtime
environment (running the BPMN processes) and passes them
to the Analyzer. The event manager is composed of an Event
Filter  that  filters  relevant  events  for  compliance  monitoring.
The Event Filter relies on a filtering mechanism and acts as a
first  step  to  reduce  the  number  of  events  that  must  be
considered by the Analyzer.
D. Analyzer
Upon  receiving  events  from  the  Event  Manager,  the
Analyzer analyses them by accessing rules from the repository.
It  uses  the  monitoring  policy  to  select  the  appropriate
monitoring rules for a particular process.
Every  policy  is  analyzed  according  to  the  ConSpec
specification. In particular, if a policy has a  Scope  “Session”
the policy is initialized when a service is invoked. For “Multi-
Session”  policies  the  initialization  is  performed  when  the
service  is  added/registered  in  the  platform.  On  the  level  of
ConSpec initialization, it means that we start with the q0 state,
assigning initial values specified in the SECURITY STATE part of
the rule to the set of declared parameters.
The Policy Decision Point (PDP) is developed as a part of
the Analyzer. The PDP helps in translating ConSpec policies
into monitoring rules and decision making. It also uploads the
initial values of global variables (i.e., specified in the Security
State part of the policy) to the memory.
Upon  receiving  events  from  the  Analyzer,  the  PDP
analyses  them  according  to  the  order  of  the  guard-update
statements  specified  in  the  policy.  The first  guard  returning
“true” fires the corresponding update (i.e., actions, which have
to  be  performed  before  continuing  of  the  execution)  and
afterwards no more statements are checked. Thus, no conflicts
are allowed to occur. Firing “true” means that we move from a
previous state of the ConSpec automata to the state with the
updated values of the considered parameters.
If no guards resulted to “true” (and no updates for  ELSE are
specified), this means a violation of the policy, i.e., we try to
make a transition which does not belong to the automata. If no
updates are necessary for some conditions, a special command
“skip”  is  envisaged.  For  example,  a  user  might  specify  a
policy (Fig. 16 in the Appendix section) to monitor the Map
service  for  trustworthiness  every  time  it  is  invoked.  As
BEFORE statement states, the property is updated before an
activity starts and if the current activity is anyone but the one
we  would  like  to  check  the  trustworthiness  value  of
(“Payment” in the example) or the value is greater than the
defined threshold (“90” in the example) nothing happens (skip
command).  The  alarm  is  raised  otherwise  (i.e.,  when  the
“Payment” service has trustworthiness less than 90). Note that
the  property  requires  a  special  external  function
(i#TrustworthinessPrediction)  to  be  invoked,  which  is
supported by our framework subject to a proper declaration of
the function in the initialization file prior to invocation.
When  the  ConSpec  policy  is  received  by  the  monitoring
module,  the  Analyzer  stores  the  policy  as  rules  in  the
repository (memory). When input (event) arrives, the PDP is
invoked to change its state and make a decision based on the
rules  stored  in  the  memory.  In  this  example,  if  the  event
corresponds to the invocation of the Map Service,  the PDP
will be invoked to retrieve the trustworthiness value and check
it against  the threshold stored in the memory. If the current
trustworthiness value falls below the threshold, a notification
will be generated. 
The  notification  alerts  are  generally  in  the  following
format:
alert("ServiceID", Type, Property); Where
ServiceID= “ID of the service involved”
Type=”the type of the notification i.e. Contract Violation”
Property=”the security property agreed to be monitored in
the agreed policy but the service failed to adhere i.e. separation
of duty”.
Fig. 5: Security Policy Monitoring Framework
VI. IMPLEMENTATION
We  have  implemented  the  monitoring  module  as  an
independent service that can easily be integrated into different
service  frameworks.  As  an  example,  we  integrated  the
monitoring module into the Aniketos platform [14]., where it is
a part of the Security Monitoring & Notification package. The
modules are running in Karaf  [24]. as remote OSGI services.
Thus, our monitoring framework is not just a part of the overall
implementation  of  the  project,  but  a  stand-alone  package,
which  can  be  easily  used  in  different  service  composition
frameworks such as [25]. or [26]., as long as its interfaces are
respected.  The  only  dependency  on  the  Aniketos  platform,
which the monitoring package has, is verification of precise,
non-pure  ConSpec,  properties  (e.g.,  trustworthiness).  On the
other hand, our package contains a mechanism, which allows
for development of a custom verification module and binding it
with the monitoring capabilities. Thus, if one does not want to
use  the  standard  Aniketos  trustworthiness  module  but  still
wants monitoring trustworthiness properties, he/she can use an
alternative implementation with a properly defined interface.
The  source  code  for  the  monitoring  module  is  available  at
GitHub [27]..
As  it  has  been  discussed  in  Section  V,  the  monitoring
module (or Security Monitoring & Notification package, as a
whole) requires ConSpec policies and the event of the running
service as input and produces notifications as output. Next, we
briefly describe the modules producing the input for a complete
description of the implementation tested in this paper.
Fig. 6: Service Composition Framework (SCF).
In our implementation ConSpec policies are produced by
the  Service  Composition  Framework  (SCF)  using  the
integrated ConSpec editor. In general, the SCF (shown in Fig.
6)  is  an  Eclipse-based  environment  which  enables  service
designers  to  build executable  composition plans and specify
their monitoring policies using the ConSpec editor. It  allows
the  modelling  of  service  compositions  in  BPMN  and  their
deployment  to the process  execution engine (Activiti  engine
[24]).  The ConSpec properties can be specified by a service
provider  or  a  service  consumer  (depending  on  the  contract
specification process performed by SCF). 
Fig. 7: ConSpec Editor.
We  have  created  a  ConSpec  editor  which  provides  a
graphical  user  interface  for  making  and  changing  ConSpec
policies  (Fig.  7).  The  tool  also  converts  the  policy  to  a
specified XML format, which simplifies policy processing by
the policy decision point (PDP) of the monitor (see Sec. 5).
The  tool  checks  the  correctness  of  the  written  policy  and
notifies the writer about possible errors.
A Service Runtime Environment (SRE) is responsible for
the execution of services (with Activiti engine) and enforcing
rules specified by the service designer. SRE interacts with the
monitoring  module  and  generates  events  for  the  running
service  that  are  then  analyzed  by the  monitoring module in
compliance with a contract (ConSpec rules).
Finally,  SRE  is  also  responsible  for  handling  the
notifications  generated  by  the  monitoring  module.  A  set  of
rules can be defined to handle these alarms. For each rule, the
service designer can specify the constraints for the event to fire
the rule and the action to be performed once the rule is fired.
For example, an action could be a recomposition, from simply
replacing  a  single  service  with  another  one  performing  the
same task. The result of this action will be a different runnable
composition plan satisfying the same security requirements as
the  substituted  Web  service.  Fig.  8  shows  the  dialogue
available into the Service Composition Framework to allow the
definition of rules used by the SRE to manage the behavior of
the composite service at runtime. For example, if the separation
of duty requirement for both PointOfInterest  service and the
WeatherForecast  service  is  violated,  the  specified  rule  will
cause  a  re-composition  by  replacing  the  WeatherForcast
service with another functionally similar service offered by a
different  provider.  For  more  details  about  SRE  and  the
Aniketos platform, in general,  we refer  the interested reader
elsewhere [29].. 
Fig. 8: Rule Editor.
VII. DEMONSTRATION THROUGH INFOSERVICE
In this section, we demonstrate our monitoring framework
using  the  InfoService  example  (recall  Sec.  2)  that  has  been
developed  on  the  Aniketos  platform.  We  consider  the
separation of duty and binding of duty security requirements
for the demonstration below.
The  way  the  atomic  services  are  composed  for  the
InfoService  (using  the  Service  Composition  Framework)  is
shown in Fig. 6. The service designer specifies the monitoring
policy  through the  ConSpec  editor  and  wants  the  following
compliance  and  security  requirements  for  the  “information
service” process:
1. Separation of duty: Both the PointOfInterest service
and the WeatherForecast service should be offered by different
service providers.
2. Binding of duty: The Map service and the
WeatherForcast service should belong to the same service
provider.
       Before service deployment, it is setup that if at runtime the
security requirements are not fulfilled then the composition has
to be recomposed (with an editor shown in Fig. 6). Finally the
composite service along with its monitoring policy is uploaded
to the Service Runtime Environment (SRE).
Fig. 9: Security policy for separation of duty.
Fig. 10: Security policy for binding of duty.
After  service  deployment,  the  runtime  environment
forwards the monitoring policy to the monitoring module along
with information about the service to monitor, i.e., Service ID.
The monitoring policy is a zipped set of XML files, each of
which contains one security policy written with the ConSpec
language.  In  other  words,  a  security  policy  is  specified  as
ConSpec rules in the form of an XML file. These policies state
the  properties  guaranteed  by  the  composite  service
specification  and  stated  as  rules.  Each  security  policy
corresponds to a specific security property. For example, Fig. 9
and Fig. 10 show two security policies for both the separation
of duty and the binding of duty. Next to these two basic and
widely  used  security  properties,  a  custom  policy  could  be
devised with ConSpec. For instance,  Fig. 11, shows a custom
policy  that  states  that  a  user  cannot  invoke  the  same
PointOfInterest  service  more  than  two  times  (rotating  the
providers should provide better privacy protection for the user).
Fig. 11: Custom policy example.
During the service execution, five Web Services are executed
and events are compiled based on the event model discussed in
Sec. 4. The events are then passed to the remote monitoring
module for analysis as shown in Fig. 12. The Event Manager
relies on a filtering mechanism and acts as a first step to reduce
the number of events to be taken into account.  Indeed, only
events that are considered as relevant for a particular service
which  needs  to  be  monitored  are  selected  by  the  Event
Manager.  This selection has to be carried out according to a
particular type of event, the existence of an attribute in an event
or a particular value of an event attribute.
Fig. 12: The events received by the monitoring module.
The events are analyzed with the help of the ConSpec PDP
(discussed in Sec. 5). The monitoring module analyses these
events and triggers alerts to the Notification module in case of
any policy violation. In our InfoService case study, both the
PointOfInterest  service  and  the  WeatherForecast  service  are
offered by the same service provider (violating the separation
of  duty  requirement)  and  the  Map  service  and  the
WeatherForcast  service  are  provided  by  different  service
providers (violating the binding of duty requirement). This is
done deliberately to check if the monitoring framework detects
the violation of these security requirements.
Fig. 13: Notification broker console.
   While  executing  the  InfoService  process,  the  monitoring
module successfully detected the violation of both the security
requirements  as  shown  in  Fig.  13.  The  Notification  broker
console is developed as a part of the Notification module to
monitor the alerts sent to the Notification module. According to
the  rule  set  at  design  time  (in  case  of  Separation  of  duty
requirement),  a  recomposition  is  triggered  and  leads  to  the
substitution  of  the  WeatherForcast  service  with  another
WeatherForcast service offer by the provider other than the one
who provides the PointOfInterest service.
VIII. EVALUATION
This section intends to evaluate how the monitoring module
of the proposed framework  behaves under  high load and to
pragmatically  infer  the  number  of  services  that  can  be
monitored by one instance. The performance and scalability of
the monitoring framework is mainly influenced by two factors:
the complexity of the policy and the number of services being
monitored.  Our framework  can easily  scale  horizontally:  we
can easily add as many instances of the monitoring module to
ensure that each monitoring module needs only to monitor a
“reasonable” number of services.  Back to the main point, to
evaluate how a single monitoring module behaves under high
load  and  to  practically  infer  how  many  services  can  be
monitored by one instance, we used the The Grinder3, a Java-
based load testing distributed framework. We implemented a
script  for  the  load-testing  platform  that  generated  random
service identifiers, loaded a set of security policies, and sent a
pre-planned script of events to the compliance monitor. This
was executed by eight threads for a period of approximately
70-minutes.  The  logs  produced  during  this  test  were  then
processed using The Grinder Analyzer4.
3 http://grinder.sourceforge.net/
4 http://track.sourceforge.net/
Fig. 14: Graph of transactions per-second (upper plot) and mean
response times (lower plot) for the compliance monitor
implementation.
Fig.  14 shows the  number  of  transactions  processed  per
second by the compliance monitor whilst under load from eight
clients.  The number of  transactions processed  reflects  (or  at
least  gives  a  rough  indication  on)  the  complexity  of  the
monitoring policy – the more transactions, the more complex
policy, and vice versa. This graph shows that the compliance
monitor is capable of handling heavy loads, responding for the
majority of the tests between 300-340 transactions per second
with response times that were generally under one-second. The
anomaly that occurs approximately fifty-minutes into the test,
shown in Fig. 14, is caused by periodic garbage collection of
many  flyweight  objects  instantiated  during  the  monitoring
process and will be corrected for later releases.
Table 1: Load-testing results
Table. 1 provides a breakdown of the performance information
by  operation.  The  Web  service  interface  of  the  compliance
monitor implementation supports three operations: creating a
monitor for a service and a set of security policies, destroying a
monitor when it is no longer required, and processing an event
generated by a service to verify its compliance to the policy.
The operations to create and destroy monitors were invoked
approximately  134,000  times  during  the  load  test,  with  the
discrepancy  between  creating  and  destroying  monitors
explained  by a combination of  the 984 failed process  event
operations  and  the  manual  termination  of  the  load-test  after
approximately  70-minutes.   Significantly  more  invocations
were made to the process event operation, which in the overall
majority of cases responded in less than one-second. This also
includes  a  large  number  of  events  which  were  not  in
compliance with the monitoring policy in place. These events
were  ignored  and  did  not  cause  any  notifications  to  be
generated.   
Out  of  the  984  failed  tests,  500  customized  tests  were
conducted where the processing event attributes were not in the
correct  order,  or  the  values  were  incorrect.  Thus,  the
monitoring module was not in a position to process them and
resulted in failed process event operations. The remaining 484
of the 984 failed tests were caused by the testing tool as it
failed to process some events. 
To conclude, a single instance of the monitoring module is
capable of monitoring many services in compliance with a pre-
defined  security  policy,  and  performs  well  even  when  the
monitoring  instance  is  under  heavy  load.  The  framework
supports a rich collection of events and attributes that apply at
the level of services within a service composition.
IX. RELATED WORK
The business operations of today’s enterprises are heavily
influenced by the Business Process modeling of both internal
and  external  business  events.  Data  collected  during  the
execution of business processes are used for identifying the key
performance  indicators  (KPI)  that  enable  the  continuous
monitoring and tracking of the process behavior and guarantee
its  correct  execution.  A  number  of  approaches  exist  in  the
literature  that  focuses  on  how  KPIs  are  modeled  and
transferred  into  events  by  a  model-driven  approach
[30].[31].[32].[33].. The work of Ly et al.  [34]. developed a
framework  comparing  approaches  for  monitoring  business
process compliance based on a well-defined set of monitoring
functionalities. They emphasize that existing approaches do not
provide a solution that combines an expressive language with
full compliance. 
SALMon [35]. is a generic framework for monitoring the
service-based  system  lifecycle.  The  framework  is  platform
independent and flexible.  It  is  able to translate a SLA (e.g.,
written with the WS-Agreement standard) to the specific type
of  document,  called  Monitoring  Management  Document,
which  is  needed  in  order  to  configure  the  monitor.  The
measurements are provided to the platform with a push or pull
method  and  the  values  are  checked  against  the  constraints
specified in the SLA. In contrast to this work, our framework
does not require a translation of rules (since monitoring uses
the same ConSpec language) and is created to monitor complex
policies  (which  require  more  complex  logic),  followed  by
checking the constraints for the values. Similar to SALMon,
our  framework  is  able  to  add  new  measurement  functions
without  any  modification  of  the  engine,  but  by  a  simple
declaration of a new measurement. 
In  another  work  [36].,  the  authors  incorporated  an
Agreement  Document  Analysis  (ADA)  module  into  their
framework. This module was aimed to provide an explanation
to the monitored values. The rules for analysis are expressed as
a Constraint Satisfaction Problem (CSP), so the authors require
additional mapping, plus, the expressiveness of CSP rules is
bound with the languages used for SLA definition. This allows
the rules analyzed to be simple checks that the received values
are  within  the  defined  limits  (at  least,  the  authors  do  not
provide any more policies for analysis). The work of Calabro et
al.  [37]. presents  a framework  for  performance analysis and
optimization  of  a  business  process  expressed  in  BPMN.  It
concentrates  on  generating  an  event-based  monitoring
approach that relies on the collection and evaluation of time
and cost-based parameters. Chen et al.  [38]. proposed a Web
service runtime monitoring method based on a probe, which
uses  aspect-oriented  programming  (AOP)  to  realize  the
monitoring  for  Web  service  abnormalities,  running  time,
reliability  and  availability.  The  monitoring  mechanism
involves  capturing  the  information  of  services’  exceptions,
execution  time  and  status  events  by  inserting  an  AOP
monitoring  probe  in  the  original  the  Web  service.  The
exceptions  belong  to  the  Java  object,  captured  by  the  Java
virtual machine once occurred in the running of Web service
code.  Wu et  al.  [39]. proposed  an AOP-based  approach  for
identifying  patterns  in  BPEL processes.  They  use  a  stateful
aspect  extension allowing the definition of behavior patterns
that should be identified. If identified, different actions can be
triggered. It also permits monitoring certain patterns by using
history-based  point-cuts.  However,  monitoring  is  limited  to
instances of a BPEL process. The work presented by Baresi et
al. [40].; Haiteng and Zhiqing [41].; Wu et al. [39]. is based on
how  to  monitor  dynamic  service  compositions  (BPEL
processes) with respect to contracts expressed via assertions on
services.  Assertions  are  specified  with  a  special-purpose
specification language called WSCoL (Web Service Constraint
Language), for applying constraints (monitoring rules) on the
service execution.  In Haiteng and Zhiqing  [41].,  the authors
proposed a solution to the problem of monitoring Web service
instances  implemented  using  BPEL.  The  solution  used  a
Monitoring  Broker  to  access  Web  service  runtime  state
information  and  calculates  the  Quality  of  Service  (QoS)
property  values.  The Monitoring Broker is  devised with the
support  of  aspect-oriented  programming  that  separates  the
business  logic  of  the  Web  service  from  its  monitoring
functionality.  Barnawi  et  al.  [42]. presented  a  pattern-based
process  to  embed  compliance  monitoring  logic  within  the
process  definition.  The  approach  targets  BPMN  based
processes  to  monitor  runtime-related  aspects  such  as  timing
and resource assignment constraints.  A compliance expert  is
needed to visually specify the compliance rules, which are then
embedded within the definition of a business process.  While
there  are  a  number  of  related  techniques,  we  believe  our
framework is novel in its ability to monitor both atomic and
composite  services.  It  does  not  require  assertions  to  define
what has to be monitored using a proprietary language. Our
framework  performs  compliance  monitoring  of  complex
security properties by using a non-intrusive AOP mechanism
and has direct access to the service execution environment. 
Martín  and  Pimentel  [43]. proposed  using  security
adaptation contracts, which can adapt service orchestration in a
secure  way.  The  authors  use  several  specific  constructs  to
express usual security requirements for services (derived from
a  number  of  Web  service  security  standards,  like  WS-
Security), check the process for possible violations and have
the main focus on adaptation of the orchestration in order to
avoid violation of contract terms. Ciancia et al. [44]. extended
the work with a richer specification language (CryptoCCS) and
provided transformation from BPMN to this language. Instead,
in our paper,  we focus on monitoring of security properties,
define how and where monitoring actions must be performed,
and  trigger  the  notification  mechanism.  Naturally,  the
adaptation  of  a  service  composition  is  one  of  the  possible
further steps, but this is not the main focus of this paper. 
The work presented by Alhamazani et al.  [45]. discussed
several  monitoring tools  developed for  the  cloud computing
environment.  However,  these  tools  have  mainly  focused  on
monitoring the low level aspects of resources deployed in the
cloud  (e.g.,  memory,  CPU,  disk)  [42]..  Our  framework
considers the monitoring and compliance of the high level and
logical  security  aspects  of  the  cloud  computing  business
process without relying on any external monitoring component
where the entire execution environment is mainly controlled by
the cloud providers.  CloudWatch [46]. is a monitoring service
providing comprehensive monitoring for cloud resources and
applications  run  by  customers  on  Amazon  Web  Services
(AWS). CloudWatch can collect and track metrics, collect and
monitor  log files,  set  alarms,  and  react  to  changes  in  AWS
resources. Thus, Amazon CloudWatch is a useful monitoring
solution for Amazon Cloud users; however, the way, in which
monitoring data are gathered,  collected  and analyzed,  is  not
transparent. Further, it is restricted to AWS products.  Nagios
[47]. is  an  open  source-monitoring  framework  that  allows
monitoring of IT infrastructure to ensure proper functioning of
systems, applications, and services.  It is designed to utilise a
list of plug-ins that would be executed to monitor the target
system. However, Aceto et al.  [48]. suggested that Nagios is
not suitable for a rapidly changing dynamic infrastructure (i.e.,
SOA-based  applications  are  highly  dynamic  and  liable  to
change heavily at runtime) and is not suitable for as-is adoption
in Cloud scenarios. Plugins in Nagios can be easily developed
and leverage its flexibility in a way that could monitor virtually
any type of network [49].. Our framework could be seamlessly
integrated  into  Nagios  as  a  plugin  to  perform  the  security
monitoring  of  BPMN-based  services  in  compliance  with  a
predefined security policy written in ConSpec.
X. CONCLUSIONS
We have presented a monitoring framework for SOA-based
systems, which is particularly tailored for  detecting security,
privacy,  and  trustworthiness  violations  of  service
compositions.  The  monitoring  framework  ensures  that  the
service  behaves  in  compliance  with  a  predefined  security
policy.  The  approach  enables  monitoring  across  multiple
composite  services,  and  integrates  dynamic  changes  from
various  subsystems  efficiently  with  high  performance.  This
monitoring framework is, of course, only one building block of
a holistic approach for the secure and trustworthy construction
and  execution  of  service  compositions:  while  we  did  not
discuss  the  related  details  in  this  paper,  the  presented
monitoring  framework  was  integrated  into  the  Aniketos
platform which supports the design-time and runtime aspects
of secure and trustworthy service compositions. Nevertheless,
it  is  implemented  as  a  stand-alone  package  which  can  be
applied in diverse service orchestrating platforms.
Compared  with  other  existing  solutions,  the  monitoring
framework  presented  here  offers  flexibility  as  well  as
applicability in the context of composite services. To achieve
this,  the  platform  supports  a  rich  collection  of  events  and
attributes that apply at the level  of services within a service
composition.  We  demonstrated  this  using  a  real  composite
service invocation monitored against the user specified security
policy.  Our proposed monitoring framework provides a user
friendly  interface  for  service  designers  to  specify  their
monitoring  policies  as  ConSpec  rules.  A  policy  written  in
ConSpec is easily understandable by humans and the simplicity
of the language allows a comparatively simple semantics. This
enables the service designer to easily specify the monitoring
requirements for their processes and monitor them using the
framework. The novelty of our work stems from the way in
which monitoring information can be combined from multiple
dynamic  services  to  automate  the  monitoring  of  business
processes  and  proactively  report  compliance  violations.
Moreover,  service  users  may  specify  their  own  properties
(using  ConSpec)  and  include  them  into  the  contract  for
monitoring. Generally, the service composition providers can
subscribe to different Alerts through the Notification module.
Alerts  regarding  policy violation are  sent  as  notifications  to
those who subscribed them, enabling verification and decision
making.  
We  see  several  lines  of  future  work  to  increase  the
applicability of our framework, including:
1. To increase the usability, we are investigating high-
level  notations (e.g.,  SecureBPMN  [14].[15].)  for  specifying
the properties that need to be monitored. On the one hand, our
monitoring framework is very flexible. On the other hand, it
results  in  runtime  overheads  that  can  be  reduced  if  certain
properties can be guaranteed statically (e.g., based on a formal
analysis  at  design-time)  and  hence  excluded  from  the
monitoring  at  runtime.  We  will  investigate  approaches  that
allow deciding, on a case-by-case basis, if a property of a given
service composition should be validated statically or monitored
at runtime.
2. The violations of  required  properties  should be not
only detected but also reacted (pro-actively) by an execution
framework  for  service  compositions to minimize  the overall
number of violations as well as ensure the availability. Thus,
we  need  to  integrate  techniques  for  dynamic  service
replacements and service re-composition that require explicit
user consent or are completely hidden from the end users.
XI. BIBLIOGRAPHY
[1]. Zhou,  B and  Shi,  Q  and  Yang,  P.  2016.  A  Survey  on  Quantitative
Evaluation of Web Service Security. In: The 15th IEEE International
Conference  on  Trust,  Security  and  Privacy  in  Computing  and
Communications, 23 August 2016 - 26 August 2016, Tianjin, China.
[2]. Asim M,  Zarzosa  S,  Shi  Q,  Zhou  B.  2015.  A  Policy  Specification
Language for Composite Services. The Fifth International Conference
on Advanced Collaborative Networks, Systems and Applications.  St.
Julians, Malta.
[3]. Ghezzi, C., Guinea, S., 2007. Run-time monitoring in service-oriented
architectures. In: Baresi, L., Nitto, E. (Eds.), Test and Analysis of Web
Services. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, pp. 237–264.
[4]. Baker, Thar, Michael Mackay, Amjad Shaheed, and Bandar Aldawsari.
"Security-oriented  cloud  platform  for  soa-based  scada."  In Cluster,
Cloud  and  Grid  Computing  (CCGrid),  2015  15th  IEEE/ACM
International Symposium on, pp. 961-970. IEEE, 2015.
[5]. Karam, Yasir,  Thar Baker,  and Azzelarabe  Taleb-Bendiab.  "Security
Support for Intention Driven Elastic Cloud Computing." In Computer
Modeling and Simulation (EMS), 2012 Sixth UKSim/AMSS European
Symposium on, pp. 67-73. IEEE, 2012.
[6]. Al-Sharif, Sultan, Farkhund Iqbal, T. Baker, and A. Khattack. "White-
Hat Hacking Framework for Promoting Security Awareness." In New
Technologies,  Mobility  and  Security  (NTMS),  2016  8th  IFIP
International Conference on, pp. 1-6. IEEE, 2016.
[7]. Lemos,  A.L.,  Daniel,  F.  and  Benatallah,  B.,  2016.  Web  service
composition:  a  survey  of  techniques  and  tools.  ACM  Computing
Surveys (CSUR), 48(3), p.33. 
[8]. OMG, 2011. Business Process Model and Notation (BPMN) Version
2.0. Available via http://www.omg.org/spec/BPMN/2.0/ on 26/02/2015.
[9]. Skouradaki, M., Roller, D.H., Leymann, F., Ferme, V. and Pautasso, C.,
2015,  January.  On  the  road  to  benchmarking  BPMN  2.0  workflow
engines.  In  Proceedings  of  the  6th  ACM/SPEC  International
Conference on Performance Engineering (pp. 301-304). ACM.
[10]. Asim, M.,  Llewellyn-Jones,  D.,  Lempereur,  B.,  Bo,  Z.,  2013.  Event
driven monitoring of composite services. In: Proceedings of the 2013
International  Conference  on  Social  Computing  (SocialCom).  IEEE,
Alexandria, pp. 550 – 557.
[11]. Asim, M., Yautsiukhin, A., Brucker, A. D. Security Policy Monitoring
of  Composite  Services.  In  Secure  and  Trustworthy  Service
Composition:  The Aniketos Approach. No. 8900 in Lecture Notes in
Computer  Science:  State  of  the  Art  Surveys.  Springer-Verlag,
Heidelberg, 2014; 192-202.
[12]. Aktug, I., Naliuka, K., 2008. Conspec: A formal language for policy
specification.  Science  of  Computer  Programming  74  (1–2),  2  –  12,
special Issue on Security and Trust.
[13]. Drools Fusion: http://drools.jboss.org/drools-fusion.html
[14]. Brucker, A. D., Dalpiaz, F., Giorgini, P., Meland, P. H., Rios, E. (Eds.),
2014.  Secure  and  Trustworthy  Service  Composition:  The  Aniketos
Approach. No. 8900 in Lecture Notes in Computer Science: State of the
Art Surveys. Springer-Verlag, Heidelberg.
[15]. Brucker, A.D., 2013. Integrating security aspects into business process
models. it–Information Technology it–Information Technology, 55(6),
pp.239-246.
[16]. Elshaafi,  H.,  and Botvich, D. 2016. Optimisation-based collaborative
determination of  component  trustworthiness  in  service  compositions.
Security Comm. Networks, 9: 513–527. doi: 10.1002/sec.985.
[17]. Brucker,  A.  D.,  Hang,  I.,  Lückemeyer,  G.,  Ruparel,  R.,  2012.
Securebpmn: Modeling and enforcing access  control  requirements in
business processes. In: Proceedings of the 17th ACM Symposium on
Access Control Models and Technologies. SACMAT ’12. ACM, New
York, NY, USA, pp. 123–126.
[18]. Llewellyn-Jones, D and Asim, M., 2013. Requirements for Composite
Security Pattern Specification. In: Second International Workshop on
Cyberpatterns  2013:  Unifying  Design  Patterns  with  Security,  Attack
and Forensic Patterns, Abingdon, UK.
[19]. OASIS, 2013. eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML)
Version 3.0. Available via http: //docs.oasis-open.org/xacml/3.0/xacml-
3. 0-core-spec-os-en.pdf on 26/02/2015.
[20]. Shanahan, M., 1999. The event calculus explained. In: Wooldridge, M.,
Veloso, M. (Eds.), Artificial Intelligence Today. Vol. 1600 of Lecture
Notes in Computer Science. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, pp. 409–430.
[21]. Bonatti,  P.  A.,  Coi,  J.  L.  D.,  Olmedilla,  D.,  Sauro,  L.,  2010.
PROTUNE: A Rule-based PROvisional TrUst NEgotiation Framework.
[22]. S3MS:  Security  of  software  services  of  mobile  systems,
http://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/78380_en.html
[23]. Erlingsson,  U.,  2004.  The  inlined  reference  monitor  approach  to
security  policy  enforcement.  Ph.D.  thesis,  Department  of  Computer
Science, Cornell University.
[24]. Apache Karaf: https://karaf.apache.org/
[25]. Lécué, F., Silva, E., Pires, L. F., 2008. A framework for dynamic web
services composition. In: Gschwind, T., Pautasso, C. (Eds.), Emerging
Web Services Technology, Volume II.  Whitestein Series in Software
Agent Technologies and Autonomic Computing. Birkhäuser Basel, pp.
59–75.
[26]. Oster, Z. J., Ali, S. A., Santhanam, G. R., Basu, S., Roop, P. S., 2012. A
service  composition  framework  based  on  goal-oriented  requirements
engineering,  model checking,  and qualitative  preference  analysis.  In:
Liu,  C.,  Ludwig,  H.,  Toumani,  F.,  Yu,  Q.  (Eds.),  Service-Oriented
Computing. Vol. 7636 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Springer
Berlin Heidelberg, pp. 283–297.
[27]. SPMM: https://github.com/AniketosEU/Security-Monitoring-and-
Notification/tree/master/aniketos-policymonitoring
[28]. Activiti engine: http://www.activiti.org
[29]. D’Errico, M., Malmignati,  F., Andreotti,  G. F., 2011. A platform for
secure and trustworthy service composition. In: In Proceedings of the
The Fifth International Conference on Cloud Computing, GRIDs, and
Vir-tualization (Cloud Computing 2014).
[30]. Koetter, F. and Kochanowski, M., 2015. A model-driven approach for
event-based business process monitoring. Information Systems and e-
Business Management, 13(1), pp.5-36. 
[31]. Calabro, A., Lonetti, F. and Marchetti, E., 2015, August. Monitoring of
business  process  execution  based  on  performance  indicators.  In
Software Engineering and Advanced Applications (SEAA), 2015 41st
Euromicro Conference on (pp. 255-258). IEEE.
[32]. Krumeich, J., Mehdiyev, N., Werth, D. and Loos, P.,  2015, October.
Towards  an  extended  metamodel  of  event-driven  process  chains  to
model  complex  event  patterns.  In  International  Conference  on
Conceptual Modeling (pp. 119-130). Springer International Publishing.
[33]. Krumeich, J.,  Weis,  B.,  Werth, D. and Loos, P.,  2014. Event-driven
business process management: where are we now? A comprehensive
synthesis  and  analysis  of  literature.  Business  Process  Management
Journal, 20(4), pp.615-633.
[34]. Ly, L.T., Maggi, F.M., Montali, M., Rinderle-Ma, S. and van der Aalst,
W.M.,  2015.  Compliance  monitoring  in  business  processes:
Functionalities, application, and tool-support. Information systems, 54,
pp.209-234.
[35]. Oriol,  M.,  Franch,  X.  and  Marco,  J.,  2015.  Monitoring  the  service-
based  system  lifecycle  with  SALMon.  Expert  Systems  with
Applications, 42(19), pp.6507-6521.
[36]. Muller, C., Oriol, M., Franch, X., Marco, J., Resinas, M., Ruiz-Cortes,
A.  and  Rodriguez,  M.,  2014.  Comprehensive  explanation  of  SLA
violations at runtime. IEEE Transactions on Services Computing, 7(2),
pp.168-183.
[37]. Calabrò,  A.,  Lonetti,  F.,  Marchetti,  E.  and  Spagnolo,  G.O.,  2016,
September. Enhancing Business Process Performance Analysis through
Coverage-Based  Monitoring.  In  Quality  of  Information  and
Communications  Technology  (QUATIC),  2016  10th  International
Conference on the (pp. 35-43). IEEE.
[38]. Chen, L., Xiong, D., Wang, H. and Zou, P., 2016, June. Web service
run-time monitoring and visualization analysis based on probe. In Data
Science in Cyberspace (DSC), IEEE International Conference on (pp.
446-451). IEEE. 
[39]. Wu,  G.,  Wei,  J.,  Huang,  T.,  2008.  Flexible  pattern  monitoring  for
wsbpel through stateful aspect extension. In: Proceedings of the 2008
IEEE  International  Conference  on  Web  Services.  ICWS  ’08.  IEEE
Computer Society, Washington, DC, USA, pp. 577–584.
[40]. Baresi,  L.,  Guinea,  S.,  Nano,  O.,  Spanoudakis,  G.,  May  2010.
Comprehensive monitoring of bpel processes. IEEE Internet Computing
14 (3), 50–57.
[41]. Haiteng,  Z.,  Zhiqing,  S.,  2011.  Runtime  monitoring  web  services
implemented  in  bpel.  In:  Proceedings  of  the  2011  International
Conference  on  Uncertainty  Reasoning  and  Knowledge  Engineering
(URKE). Vol. 1. Bali, pp. 228 – 231.
[42]. Barnawi, A., Awad, A., Elgammal, A., El Shawi, R., Almalaise, A. and
Sakr, S., 2015. Runtime self-monitoring approach of business process
compliance in cloud environments. Cluster Computing, 18(4), pp.1503-
1526.
[43]. Martín, J.A. and Pimentel, E., 2011. Contracts for security adaptation.
The Journal of Logic and Algebraic Programming, 80(3-5), pp.154-179.
[44]. Ciancia, V., Martín, J. A., Martinelli, F., Matteucci, I., Petrocchi, M.,
Pimentel, E., 2014. Automated synthesis and ranking of secure BPMN
orchestrators. IJSSE 5 (2), 44–64.
[45]. Alhamazani,  K.,  Ranjan,  R.,  Mitra,  K.,  Rabhi,  F.,  Jayaraman,  P.P.,
Khan, S.U., Guabtni, A. and Bhatnagar, V., 2015. An overview of the
commercial cloud monitoring tools: research dimensions, design issues,
and state-of-the-art. Computing, 97(4), pp.357-377.
[46]. Amazon CloudWatch. http://aws.amazon.com 
[47]. Nagios. http://www.nagios.org
[48]. Aceto,  G.,  Botta,  A.,  De Donato,  W. and Pescapè,  A.,  2013.  Cloud
monitoring: A survey. Computer Networks, 57(9), pp.2093-2115.
[49]. Rodrigues, G.D.C., Calheiros, R.N. and Guimaraes, V.T., 2016. GL d.
Santos, MB de Carvalho, LZ Granville, LMR Tarouco, and R. Buyya,
Monitoring  of  cloud  computing  environments:  Concepts,  solutions,
trends, and future directions. In Proceedings of the 31st Annual ACM
Symposium on Applied Computing, SAC (Vol. 16, pp. 378-383).
I. APPENDIX
No Delegation policy can be devised as is it written in Fig.
15.
Figure 15: No Delegation policy.
The  same  policy  may  be  applied  to  all  services  in  a
hierarchy if the policy is defined with a template. For example,
it is easy to see that in the Trustworthiness policy shown in Fig.
16, the two parameters that make it specific are: ServiceID and
Value. Thus, it is enough to devise a ConSpec template that
simply requires these two inputs. If we require all sub-services
to  have  the  same  property,  we  should  simply  change  the
ServiceID parameter for all of them. This, however, is just a
facilitating procedure for policy making, and it does not affect
the monitoring features, since the property is to be defined as a
standalone  ConSpec  rule  in  the  end.  We  implement  the
template handling feature  within our ConSpec Editor saving
the results as a separate xml file. When a user would like to
instantiate  the  policy,  he/she  are  prompted  for  the  required
inputs and the editor forms the policy automatically. Moreover,
our CSF is able to devise a policy per lower services in the
hierarchy automatically, using a similar procedure.
Figure 16: Trustworthiness
